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THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
v.
Case No. 900093-CA
Priority #2

JOHN FISHER,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from defendant's sentencing on January 23, 1990, on
the charge of Possession of a Controlled Substance Inside a
Correctional Facility, a class B misdemeanor, in the Third Circuit
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Salt Lake City
Department, the Honorable Paul G. Grant presiding.

ROGER K. SCOWCROFT (5141)
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
424 East 500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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Assistant Utah Attorney General
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Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
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THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
v.
Case No. 900093-CA
Priority #2

JOHN FISHER,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is taken from the trial court's denial of the
defendant's Motion to Amend Sentence following resentencing of the
defendant on January 23, 1990, on the charge of Possession of a
Controlled Substance Inside a Correctional Facility, a class B
misdemeanor.

On November 16, 1989, the defendant pleaded "guilty"

to the same charge as a class A misdemeanor.

The charge was reduced

to a class B misdemeanor on January 23, 1990, and the defendant
again pleaded guilty.

The defendant was then sentenced to

consecutively serve six months incarceration in the Salt Lake County
Jail following his release from the Young Adult Correctional
Facility at Draper.

The defendant contends on appeal that the

sentence imposed on January 23, 1990, violates due process of law
because it is more severe in effect than the original sentence
imposed on November 16, 1989, and fails to give credit for time
served.

U.S. Const, amends. V, XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art. I, § 7.

C^C-CA^)
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ROGER K. SCOWCROFT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
JOHN FISHER,

:

Case No. 900093-CA
Priority #2

Defendant/Appellant.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 27, 1989, Mr. Fisher was found to be in possession
of less than one ounce of marijuana while inside the boundaries of
the Young Adult Correctional Facility ("YACF") at Draper. Mr.
Fisher was then, and still is, an inmate serving a sentence at that
facility.
Mr. Fisher was subsequently charged with a third degree
felony under § 58-37-8, Utah Code Ann. (1989).

The State then

amended the charge to a class A misdemeanor, pursuant to § 57-38-8
(2)(b) and (c), because the amount of marijuana in Mr. Fisher's
possession was less than one ounce.

On November 16, 1989, Mr.

Fisher pleaded "guilty" as charged to the class A misdemeanor.

See

Transcript of November 16, 1989 at 2; hereinafter "NT". Judge Grant
then sentenced Mr. Fisher to serve one year incarceration at the
prison and relinquished jurisdiction of the case to the Board of
Pardons.

NT:5. Judge Grant did not order that the term of sentence

run consecutively with the sentence Mr. Fisher is already serving.
NT: 5.
- 1 -

Some time after November 16, 1989, defense counsel realized
that Mr. Fisher had been incorrectly charged with a class A
misdemeanor, and that based on the facts of this case he should have
been charged with a class B misdemeanor under § 58-37-8(2)(e), Utah
Code Ann. (1989).

Therefore, based on defense Motion, Mr. Fisher

returned to court on January 23, 1990, and withdrew his plea of
"guilty" to the class A misdemeanor entered on November 16, 1989.
See Transcript of January 23, 1990, at 3; hereinafter "JT". The
charge was amended to a class B misdemeanor on defense Motion and
Stipulation of the State.
charged.

JT:3. Mr. Fisher then pleaded guilty as

JT:4. Judge Grant then sentenced Mr. Fisher to serve six

months incarceration at the Salt Lake County Jail to run
consecutively with the sentence being served by Mr. Fisher at YACF,
and to begin upon Mr. Fisher's release from YACF. JT:4.
On February 6, 1990, defense counsel submitted a Motion to
Amend Sentence to (1) run concurrently with the time served at YACF
and (2) give credit for time served since the first sentencing on
November 16, 1989.

See Addendum A.

On February 20, 1990, defense

counsel filed a Notice of Appeal.

Judge Grant denied the Motion to

Amend Sentence on March 21, 1990.

See Addendum B.

On March 23, 1990, Mr. Fisher appeared before the Utah Board
of Pardons.

Based on the allegation of possessing marijuana inside

a correctional facility, Mr. Fisher's release date was delayed until
September 10, 1991.

See Addendum C.

- 2 -

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court pursuant to §
78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1989), whereby a defendant in a
criminal case may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a
final judgment in a Circuit Court.

- 3 -

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The defendant contends that he was more severely punished
upon resentencing on a lower class of offense based on the same
conduct.

Defendant further contends that the imposition of a more

severe sentence violates his constitutional rights of due process.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SENTENCE IMPOSED BY THE CIRCUIT COURT ON
JANUARY 23, 1990, VIOLATES DUE PROCESS OF LAW
BECAUSE IT IS MORE SEVERE IN EFFECT THAN THE
SENTENCE IMPOSED ON NOVEMBER 16, 1989, AND FAILS
TO GIVE CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED.
Section 76-3-405, Utah Code Ann. (1978), prohibits the
imposition of a more severe sentence where a conviction or prior
sentence is set aside:

76-3-405. Limitation on sentence where
conviction or sentence set aside. Where a
conviction or sentence has been set aside on
direct review or on collateral attack, the
court shall not impose a new sentence for
the same conduct which is more severe than
the prior sentence less the portion of the
prior sentence previously satisfied.
In State v. Sorenson, 639 P. 2d 179, 181 (Utah 1981), the Supreme
Court of Utah, interpreting § 76-3-405, held that a second sentence

- 4 -

cannot exceed the first in appearance or effect, in the number of its
elements or in their magnitude, nor can an increase in one element of
a sentence be justified by a decrease in another element.

The Court

reasoned, inter alia, that due process requires that a defendant be
freed from the apprehension of judicial retaliation by an increased
sentence for maintaining his defense. Jj3. at 180; see U.S. Const,
amends. V and XIV, § 1, and Utah Const, art. I, § 7.
In the case at bar, the resentencing of Mr. Fisher violates
§ 76-3-405 and constitutional due process because he was resentenced
to a consecutive term of incarceration and not given credit for time
already served under the original sentence.

A.
sentence.

Consecutive sentencing constitutes a "more severe"

On November 16, 1989, Judge Grant sentenced Mr. Fisher to

serve twelve months incarceration and did not order that it be served
consecutively to the term already being served by Mr. Fisher.
Because Judge Grant did not order that the term be served
consecutively, the term runs concurrently under § 76-3-401 (1), Utah
Code Ann. (Supp. 1989):
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been
adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to
impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the
offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run
concurrently unless the court states in the sentence that
they shall run consecutively.
Thus, under the November 16, 1989, sentence, the twelve-month
commitment would have expired prior to Mr. Fisher's release date of
September 10, 1991:
(6)

In determining the effect of consecutive sentences and
- 5 -

the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of
Pardons shall treat the defendant as though he has been
committed for a single term that shall consist of the
aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year
limitation the maximum sentence is considered to be 30
years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively,
the minimum term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of
the validly imposed minimum terms.
(7) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to
run concurrently with the other or with a sentence presently
being served, the lesser sentence shall merge into the
greater and the greater shall be the term to be served. If
the sentences are equal and concurrent, they shall merge
into one sentence with the most recent conviction
constituting the time to be served.
Section 76-3-401(6), (7), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1980).
Judge Grant could have ordered that the twelve-month
commitment be served consecutively:
(8) This section may not be construed to restrict the
number or length of individual consecutive sentences
that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any
sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of
sentences actually served under the commitments.
(9) This section may not be construed to limit the
authority of a court to impose consecutive sentences in
misdemeanor cases.
Section 76-3-401(8), (9), Otah Code Ann. (Supp. 1989).

Further, Mr.

Fisher does not have an absolute right to have the Board of Pardons
assume jurisdiction over the conviction on a class A misdemeanor:
76-3-208. Imprisonment - Custodial authorities* - (1)
Persons sentenced to imprisonment shall be committed to
the following custodial authorities:
(a) Felony commitments shall be to the Utah State
Prison;
(b) Class A misdemeanor commitments may be to the
Utah State Prison if the defendant consents;
(c) Misdemeanor commitments shall be to the jail, or
other facility designated by the town, city or county
where the defendant was convicted.
(2) Custodial authorities may place a prisoner in a
facility other than the one to which he was committed
- 6 -

when:
(a)
(b)
it.

It does not have space to accommodate him; or
The security of the institution or inmate requires

Section 76-3-208(b), Utah Code Ann. (1978).

Thus, Judge Grant could

have ordered that the twelve-month commitment be served
consecutively, at the Salt Lake County Jail, after Mr. Fisher's
release from YACF.
On January 23, 1990, Judge Grant resentenced Mr. Fisher to
serve six months incarceration consecutively for the same conduct
after the charge was reduced to a class B misdemeanor.

That sentence

would require that Mr. Fisher serve six months in the Salt Lake
County Jail after he is released from YACF on September 10, 1991.
See Addendum C.

Judge Grant could have allowed the six-month

commitment on the class B misdemeanor conviction to be served
concurrently with Mr. Fisher's underlying commitment to YACF pursuant
to § 76-3-401 (1), (7), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1989).

The January 23,

1990, resentencing violates statute and constitutional due process
because it is more severe in effect than the November 16, 1989,
sentence.

See § 76-3-405, Utah Code Ann. (1978); U.S. Const, amends.

V and XIV, § 1, and Utah Const, art. I, § 7; See also State v.
Sorenson, 639 P.2d at 181.

B.

Mr. Fisher is entitled to credit for time served since

November 16, 1989.

On November 16, 1989, Mr. Fisher was ordered to

serve twelve months incarceration concurrently with the underlying
commitment at YACF.

By January 23, 1990, when the charge was amended

to a class B misdemeanor and Mr. Fisher again pleaded guilty as
- 7 -

charged, he had served 68 days of the November 16, 1989, commitment.
Section 76-3-405, Utah Code Ann. (1978), requires the resentencing
court to give credit for "the portion of the prior sentence
previously satisfied."
1315 (Utah 1987).

See also State v. Richards, 740 P.2d 1314,

Six months is the maximum statutory term of

incarceration for conviction on a class B misdemeanor.
76-3-204(2), Utah Code Ann. (1978).

Section

Thus, Mr. Fisher is entitled to

credit for time served on the November 16, 1989, sentence prior to
resentencing on January 23, 1990.

CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Fisher respectfully
petitions this Court to remand this case to the Circuit Court for
resentencing with orders that the commitment be served concurrently
with the underlying commitment to YACF, and that Mr. Fisher be given
credit for time served since November 16, 1989.
DATED t h i s

c ^ S ~ ~ d a y of A p r i l ,

1990.

Attorney for Defendapt/Appellant

- 8 -

ADDENDUM A

-

9

-

ROGER K. SCOWCROFT
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
532-5444
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

MOTION TO AMEND SENTENCE

Plaintiff,
v.

:

JOHN FISHER,

:

Case No.

891009355

Defendant.
The Defendant, JOHN W. FISHER, alleges:
1)

That on August 27, 1989, the defendant was found to be

in possession of less than one ounce of marijuana while inside the
exterior boundaries of a correctional facility;
2)

That on November 11, 1989, the defendant pleaded

"guilty" to the charge of Possession of a Controlled substance, a
class A misdemeanor under §§58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (b)(iii) and (c), Utah
Code Ann. (1989);
3)

That on November 16, 1989, the defendant was sentenced

by Judge Grant to serve 12 months incarceration to run concurrent
with time served in the Utah State Prison;
4)

That the defendant was incorrectly charged with a class

A misdemeanor;

5)

That on January 23, 1990, the defendant withdrew his

guilty plea and pleaded •guilty" to Possession of a Controlled
Substance, a class B misdemeanor under §58-37-8(2)(e), Utah Code
Ann. (1989);
6)

That on January 23, 1990, the defendant was sentenced

by Judge Grant to six months incarceration in the Salt Lake County
Jail to run consecutive with time served in the Utah State Prison;
and
7)That the sentence imposed on January 23, 1990, is illegal
because it is more severe in effect than the sentence imposed on
November 16, 1989.

Se£ §76-3-405, Utah Code Ann. (1978); and see

State v. Sorensen 689 P.2d 179 (Utah 1981).
WHEREFORE, the defendant respectfully moves this Court to
amend the sentence

imposed on January 23, 1990, (1) To run

concurrently with time served at Utah State Prison, and (2) to give
credit for time served since November 16, 1989.
DATED this

(&

day of Februar>r-±£9l0

ROGER K. SCOWCROFT
Attorney for Defenda/ft

MAILED /DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Motion to William
J. Albright, Assistant Utah Attorney General, 341 S. Main Street,
Suite 202, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this

C?

day of February,

1990.

t~t^J) r
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Jb
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

vs.

)
|

O R D E R
Case No. 891009355 FS

JOHN W. FISHER,
Defendant.

]

The Defendant originally appeared before this Court
accused of a felony.

At a roll call hearing prior to setting

of a preliminary hearing date the state reduced the charge to a
class "A11 misdemeanor to which Defendant entered a plea of not
guilty.

At a pretrial hearing on November 16, 1989 the

Defendant changed his plea to guilty after being informed that
the Court would sentence him to the maximum sentence of one
year incarceration.

After the change of plea and Defendant

being informed of his legal rights by the court, the Defendant
pursuant to statute elected to serve the one year sentence of
incarceration at the Utah State prison.
On January 23, 1990, Defendant and counsel appeared before
the Court to withdraw his plea which the Court allowed.

The

State then amended the charge to a class "B" misdemeanor to
conform to the statute.

Defendant after being advised of his

rights plead guilty to the new charge.

Again the court

informed the Defendant that he would be sentenced to the
maximum time of six months incarceration prior to entry of plea.

After sentencing defense counsel moved for concurrent
service of the sentence which motion was denied.

The Court

ordered the time to be served consecutively after the time
presently being served in the Utah State Prison.

The Court to

review the sentence after one month of served time.

There is

no statutory provision allowing an election by a Defendant to
serve a commitment for a class "Blf misdemeanor at the state
prison.
Defendant's Motion to Amend Sentence is simply a
reassertion of his request to be allowed to serve the time
concurrently.
For the same reasons as enumerated on January 23, 1990,
the Court denies Defendants Motion to Amend Sentence submitted
February 6, 1990, and brought to the Court's attention by
remitter from the Court of Appeals.
Dated this

^ f

day of March, 1990.

T^MJ^
Grar
Paul G.. Grant
Third Circuit Court Judge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order was mailed, postage prepaid to Roger K.
Scowcroft, Attorney at Law, 424 South 500 East, #300, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111 this

£)[

day of March, 1990.
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UfAl SrAii: ObSClS N'J. 90018887
Consideration of the Status of FI Sift*. JOIN *

P1ISM NO. 19469

The above-entitled matter came on for a he.-irin? before th^ Utah State Board of
Pardons on m e 2^rJ 1av of ')<rcn,
rjyo, for considfr-uion -*s:
ORIGINAL 1)I\!UNG
After the statement of

and the following witnesses:

1)
2)
and good cause appearing, ttie D o a n made tiu* following decisis* and order:

Rescind

-f

parole date,

P a r o l e t o become e f f e c t i v e

°['/Q

^j\
with following s p e c i a l c o n d i t i o n s :
-*
Amend p a r o l e a^reefT.^u IO add tne f o l l o ^ i n p soecr*i"~rohdir1on*:~

3
Rehearing for
Termination of sent^nc* and parole to become effective
Expiration of sentence effective
Other

#

OiUflh
1 0j;;3L/UY

*

SnjT CXS^l
J f> S^i HD2') I

£J;)Gh
JNJ

i^mriJN
3V02/2004

This d e c i s i o n i s s u b i e c t t<* review and M o d i f i c a t i o n hv t h e Bosni of Pardons at
anv tiijie^ u n t i l a c t u a l r H e a s e fro*» cusioilv.
Bv o r d e r of t h e Board of Pardons of th^ S t a t e of Utah, 1 have t h i s d a t e
2^rd day of via re i, 19:90, a f f i x e d wv sic>n;ture as A i m i m s t r a t o r for aid
on behalf of t h e S t a t e of Utah, Board of Pardons.

UTAH STATE PRISON
BOX 250 DRAPER, UTAH

Date Received

t/r/vo

Name of Inmate

J*i^ ^ v ^ , r

Number of Inmate

*^ * ^

~ Waited by" ^ ' ^ I^«- < r V ^ " - - r ~ ' f f

—

-

•

•

-

-

-

-

•

-

437 Sini^ ''-'^ *"': ..

s.'it Lav,? civ;. , rr u : u
For The Crime of:

Ate. Vcut-h-wlo : •»[ c / f

V*. *n,t i-J'TiT 1

CS t o prinoTi t . n e .
Hold Acknowledged

• / • -y
1

Agency to be notified •

days before prisoner ii to be releaaed.

Copy to: Agency
Board of Pardons
Classification
Inmate
Pile

DETAINER

£

v

<;

-
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AMENDMENTS
TO THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
AMENDMENT V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.

AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

ART. I, §7

CONSTITUTION OP UTAH

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.

76-3-204. Misdemeanor conviction—Term of imprisonment.—A person
who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be sentenced to imprisonment as follows:
(1) In the case of a class A misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding
one year;
(2) In the case of a class B misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding
six months ;
(3) In the case of a class C misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding
ninety days.

76-3-208. Imprisonment — Custodial authorities. — (1) Persons sentenced to imprisonment shall be committed to the following custodial
authorities:
(a) Felony commitments shall be to the Utah State Prison;
(b) Class A misdemeanor commitments may be to the Utah State
Prison if the defendant consents;
(c) Misdemeanor commitments shall be to the jail, or other facility
designated by the town, city or county where the defendant was convicted.
(2) Custodial authorities may place a prisoner in a facility other than
the one to which he was committed when:
(a) It does not have space to accommodate him; or
(b) The security of the institution or inmate requires it.

76-3-405. Limitation on sentence where conviction or prior sentence
set aside.—Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct
review or on collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence
for the same offense or for a different offense based on the same conduct
which is more severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior
sentence previously satisfied.

76-3-40L Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limitations.
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently
unless the court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively.
(2) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and
the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive sentences.
(3) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
(4) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years' imprisonment. However, this
limitation does not apply if an offense for which the defendant is sentenced
authorizes the death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
(5) The limitation in Subsection (4) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which
were committed prior to imposition of sentence for any one or more of
them; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction.
(6) In determining the effect of consecutive sentences and the manner in
which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons shall treat the defendant as
though he has been committed for a single term that shall consist of the
aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation the
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum
term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum
terms.
(7) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the lesser
sentence shall merge into the greater and the greater shall be the term to be
served. If the sentences are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one
sentence with the most recent conviction constituting the time to be served.
(8) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity
of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually
served under the commitments.
(9) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of adjudicative proceedings of
agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims
department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from district court in criminal cases, except those involving
a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs involving a
criminal conviction, except those involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including but not limited to divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals, upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court, may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter
46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.

58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties [Effective until July
1, 1990].
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person
to knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as
. a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances
listed in Schedules II through V except under an order or prescription; or
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to
distribute.
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(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order or directly from a practitioner while acting in the course
of his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsection;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place,
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations;
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present
where controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation
of this chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent,
and not concealed from those present; however, a person may not be
convicted under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not
use the substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else
to do so; any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances
by the defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense;
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance;
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled substance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in Section
78-3a-2, and "emergency" means any physical condition requiring
the administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of
pain or suffering;
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled substance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any controlled substance to another person knowing that the other person is
using a false name, address, or other personal information for the
purpose of securing the same.
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(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect
to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a
second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or marijuana, if the
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of
a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one
ounce but less than 16 ounces,
is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility
as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in
Subsection (2Kb).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled substance by a person previously convicted under Subsection
(2)(b), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than
provided in this subsection.
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all
other controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or
(iii), including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2)(a)(ii) through
(2)(a)(vii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree
felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person:
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or dispense a controlled substance in violation of this chapter;
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance to another licensee or other authorized person not
authorized by his license;
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol required by this
chapter or by a rule issued under this chapter;
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or furnish any record, notification, order form, statement, invoice, or information required under
this chapter; or
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection as authorized
by this chapter.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) shall be punished by a civil penalty of not more than $5,000. The proceedings are
independent of, and not in lieu of, criminal proceedings under this chapter or any other law of this state. If the violation is prosecuted by informa-
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tion or indictment which alleges the violation was committed knowingly
or intentionally, that person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree
felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked,
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself
to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist,
veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to
procure the administration of, or to prescribe or dispense to amy person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of or
procure the administration of, any controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a
false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter;
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in any application, report, or other document required to be kept by this chapter, or to willftilly make any false statement in any prescription,
order, report, or record required by this chapter; or
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark,
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another
or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (4)(a) is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(5) Prohibited acts E — Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful
under this section, Chapter 37a, Title 58, the Utah Drug Paraphernalia
Act, or under Chapter 37b, Title 58, the Imitation Controlled Substances
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under
Subsection (5)(b) if the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the
grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or groundis which are, at the time of the act, being used for an
activity sponsored by or through a school under Subsection (5)(a)(i);
(iii) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included
in Subsection (5)(a)(i) or (ii); or
(iv) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of
where the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsec-
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tion would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole
until the minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been
served.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at
the time of the offense, or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (5)(a) or was unaware that the
location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (5)(a).
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class
B misdemeanor.
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to,
and not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(9) (a) When it appears to the court at the time of sentencing any person
convicted under this chapter that the person has previously been convicted of an offense under the laws of this state, the United States, or
another state, which if committed in this state would be an offense within
this chapter and it appears that probation would not be of benefit to the
defendant or that probation would be contrary to the interest, welfare, or
protection of society, the court, notwithstanding Section 77-35-20, may, if
there is compliance with Subsection (9)(b), impose a minimum term to be
served by the defendant, of up to lh the maximum sentence imposed by
law for the offense committed.
(b) (i) Before any person may be sentenced to a minimum term as
provided in Subsection (9)(a), the prosecuting attorney, or grand jury
if an indictment, shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint, in
misdemeanor cases, or the information or indictment, in addition to
the substantive offense charged, a statement setting forth the alleged
past conviction of the defendant and specifically stating the date and
place of conviction and the offense of which the defendant was convicted. The allegation shall be presented to the defendant at the time
of his arraignment, or afterwards by leave of court, but in no event
later than two days prior to the trial of the offense charged or the
defendant's entering a plea of guilty. At the time of arraignment or a
later date when granted by the court, the court shall read the allegation of the previous conviction to the defendant, provide him or his
counsel with a copy of it, and explain to the defendant the consequences of the allegation under Subsection (9)(a). The allegation of
the past conviction of the defendant is not admissible in a jury trial,
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except where the admissibility in evidence of a previous conviction is
otherwise recognized as admissible by law.
(ii) The court, following conviction of the defendant of the substantive offense charged and prior to imposing sentence, shall inform the
defendant of its decision to impose a minimum sentence under Subsection (9)(a) and inquire as to whether the defendant admits or denies the previous conviction. If the defendant denies the previous
conviction, the court shall afford him an opportunity to present evidence showing that the allegation of the past conviction is erroneous
or the conviction was lawfully vacated or the defendant was pardoned. The evidence shall be made a matter of record. Following the
evidence the court shall make a finding as to whether the defendant
has a previous conviction, which finding is final, except for a showing
of abuse of discretion. Following the findings by the court the defendant shall be sentenced under Subsection (9)(a) or under the appropriate penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion determines.
(c) Any person sentenced on a second offense to probation who violates
that probation is subject to Subsections (9)(a) and (9)(b).
(d) Nothing in this section in any way limits or restricts Sections
76-8-1001 and 76-8-1002.
(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the
substance or substances.
(11) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and
supervision.
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate
scope of his employment.
(13) (a) In addition to any fines or fees otherwise imposed by the court
under this chapter, a fee of $150 shall be imposed against each person
convicted of and each juvenile found within the court's jurisdiction under
Section 78-3a-16 because of committing any offense under this chapter or
Chapter 37a or 37b, Title 58. The fee shall be collected by the court. If the
court finds the person against whom the fee is imposed is impecunious,
the court may order that the person perform community service in lieu of
the fee.
(b) The funds generated by the fee imposed by this section shall be
deposited in a restricted account in the General Fund designated as the
"Substance Abuse Prevention Account." One-half of the funds shall be
appropriated from the account to the juvenile court to pay for programs
required by Subsection 78-3a-39(10). The remaining funds shall be appropriated to the State Office of Education to be used in public school programs for:
(i) substance abuse prevention and education;
(ii) substance abuse prevention training for teachers and administrators; and
(iii) district and school programs to supplement, not supplant, existing local prevention efforts in cooperation with local substance
abuse authorities.
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